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Abstract: Unlike other faith-based conflicts, the militancy in Swat seems unique, as militants used religion
for promoting their agenda and giving voices to the grievances of the poor people through a popular
narrative likely without knowing narratology. Using narratives and narratology as a theoretical framework,
this qualitative study is an effort to understand the essence of militants’ narrative in Swat and the mechanism
through which they steered it up until the time it gained verisimilitude. Conducting 73 semi-structured
interviews, the study finds that it was a planned strategy of the militants that popularized them in Swat,
while they later lost this support due to their atrocities against general populace. The militants used the
socially and culturally constructed narrative through FM radio and motivated the masses to follow their
ideology and brand of Islamic Sharia. The study concludes that the formulation and popularization of social
narratives play vital roles in social movements and conflicts to muster popular support for promoting vested
interests that can be used against the state and general public.
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1. Introduction
Since 9/11, the international community has become very
anxious about radical ideologies, as this has led to the
narrative-based religious militancy that created a new se-
curity dilemma across the world [1]. Interestingly, conflict
studies in the 1980s reveal that two out of 64 militant groups
at that time were religiously motivated, while this number
increased to 26 out of 56 conflicts during 1990s [2]. This
sudden increase has been attributed to the success of nar-
ratives floated by militants in societies across the globe [3].
The recent narratives, promoted by religious based militants
around the world, have their inspirational base in the dogma
of Al Qaeda [4]. Al Qaeda’s ideology is articulated in its
“single narrative’, composed of explanations that give a new
and attractive image of the world to its supporters, as the
purpose of life. This portrayal provides its followers with a
cause for their existence in their surroundings [5].
Swat Valley in Pakistan is a particularly horrible example
of religious militancy, where militants gained control of the
area for almost two years. The success of militants in Swat
cannot be fully explained in terms of military victory; rather
it was the victory of a narrative, which led people of Swat to
follow the militants’ footprints [6]. In retrospect, the narrative
of Al Qaeda was borrowed and adapted by Taliban in 1994
in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas [7], which was
re-borrowed and adjusted to militants’ strategic needs in
Swat by Fazlullah. Using the specific socio-cultural environ-
c© 2020 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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ment, the leader of Tehrik e Taliban Swat (TTS) successfully
established his influence in Swat until the government of
Pakistan started military operations against him in 2009
[8]. What happened in Swat was nothing new, but instead
a repetition of what had been happening in the tribal ar-
eas of Pakistan and Afghanistan for a long time [9]. The
first wave of religious extremism in Swat was felt in the
mid 1990s, spearheaded by Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-
Mohammadi (TNSM) of Maulana Sufi Muhammad, who
pleaded for the need to address the slow and inefficient
judicial system in Swat [10]. It was the powerful narrative
of TNSM which mustered more than 10,000 fighters into
Afghanistan to fight US forces during Operation Enduring
Freedom in October 2001 [11]. In the subsequent years
Maulana Sufi Muhammad lost ground in Swat, perhaps due
to lack of a sound strategic base. However, by early 2005,
his son-in-law Fazlullah and his followers regained popular-
ity in Swat through the use of FM radio (8). Initially, the FM
radio and motivational speeches of TNSM stimulated the
general masses to support the extremist elements in Swat
[12]. Imperatively, this occurrence in Swat can simply be
attributed to the strong ideological based narrative, which
was delicately blended with political motives of TNSM [13].
It was a typical militant methodology, one which identifies
and stresses the “traditional politics, i.e., injustice, poverty,
access to resources, exploitation and corruption for the
public attention” [14]. As is often the case with extremist
organizations across the world, religion was used to jus-
tify the brutality (11). Militancy in Swat strongly affected
the peace and development in the area [15]. Terrorism in
Swat brought harassment, destruction, suicide attacks and
the senseless killing of innocent people [16]. It disturbed
the inhabitants, damaged infrastructure, caused a decline
in economic well-being, brought instability, and ripped the
social fabric of society [17]. The difference between the
narratives of Tehrik e Taliban Swat (TTS) and those of other
radicalized militants can be found in TTS’s strong linkage
with Swat’s historical legacy, prevailing socio-cultural envi-
ronment and hermeneutical confusion of general public who
were equating the militants as a rebirth of the rule of Waal e
Swat [18], the last ruler of Swat state, which is still revered
by locals in the area. Thus, the narrative constructed by
TTS was more vibrant, inclusive, planned and attractive to
the general masses [19].
1.1. Concepts of Narrative and Narratology
Narratives are fundamentally “compelling storylines which
can explain events convincingly and from which inferences
can be drawn” [20]. According to George Dimitriu, “narra-
tives are a resource for political actors to construct a shared
meaning to shape perceptions, beliefs and behavior of the
public”, they present a composition through which people
are arrayed in a specific direction by giving them an under-
standing of the past, and are an action plan for the present
and hope for the bright future [21]. Narratives are subjec-
tive accounts of events told to listeners. They are linguistic
forms of “lived experience” affecting both the narrator and
the listener [22]. Narratology assumes that the way in which
individuals experience themselves and their situations is
“constructed” within culturally mediated, social interactions
[23]. To study social phenomena through the lens of narra-
tology, some important parameters outline the narratological
explanations. Firstly, it negates the absoluteness of the real-
ity in accordance with postmodernism [24]. Thus, it creates
room for different interpretations and appeals to hermeneu-
tics of the individuals. The meanings thus constructed are in
line with a specific social, political, and cultural environment
in which the person resides. Secondly, narratives inspire
the creation of meanings in human minds, which lead their
actions. Therefore, stories in a society are the reflections
of what people would do or are likely to do [25]. Thirdly, a
single narrative may act as a strategic narrative, however
“people are not defined by a single narrative; rather, they live
with many narratives simultaneously, such as work, sport,
socializing, and family” [26]. Fourthly, culture and the pre-
vailing situation is the place where narrative acts and people
react to it, which makes the cultural environment crucial for
narrative construction and success. In narratology, culture is
operationalized as the most influential factor affecting peo-
ple’s lives [27]. Finally, the development of narrative from its
ideological basis to localization and the touch of personal
flavor make the narratives distinct from each other, both in
their making and impact.
Understanding social behavior by providing conceptual
relevancy and linguistic understanding to the social the-
ory through narratives becomes the most important part of
narratives. This is because of what Labov (2006) calls con-
ceptual narrativity, which is defined by temporality, spatiality,
and emplotment, as well as relationality and historicity. The
challenge in conceptualizing narrativity lies in devising a
vocabulary that can be used to reconstruct and plot over
time and space the ontological narratives and relationships
of historical actors, the public and cultural narratives that
inform their lives [28].
In fact, the physical presence of militants in any similar
conflict situation is always supported by their ideological
narrative. Thus, to counteract the process of militancy, it
is essential to comprehend the magnetism of the narrative
or the “messages” which they float (11). Many scholars,
like Muhammad Fayaz (2011), Muhammad Sajjad (2013),
Rafi (2017), and Javed (2015), have related the Swat con-
flict to militants’ narratives. Mostly, these scholars have
attributed the militants’ narrative in Swat to the implementa-
tion of Islamic Sharia, but there is hardly any study which
describes the stepwise construction of militants’ narrative
in Swat specifically, in line with narratological parameters.
Therefore, the phenomena of terrorism in Swat needs to
be studied within the frame of scientific knowledge, percep-
tions and the declared militants’ narratives to understand
the mystery through which militants convinced the people
of Swat to accept them on the political scene. After militants
gained control of the area, terror activities made the people
hostage to militancy. Ironically, the success of the militants
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resulted in a human security crisis in Swat in contrast to
the expectations of local population. Before their control,
however, it was not the militancy of the militants but the
narrative which they floated that attracted and convinced
people. Although the literature identifies different narrato-
logical standings of militants in Swat, the general public in
Swat as well as in Pakistan still wonders why the militants’
narrative was so attractive to the people in Swat. If it was
just a political stunt, then why politicians aren’t as effective
as the militants were? If it was religious dogma, then why
weren’t religious figures regarded as saviors of peoples’
political rights before and after the conflict? This study is
an effort to uncover those delicate links which led to the
militants’ narrative formulation and its success in Swat. To
do this, the study evaluates the narrative construction mech-
anisms of militants in Swat and analyzes the push factors
that fostered their narrative in public.
2. Theoretical Foundations
This study is guided by the concept of “Narratology”. From
its advent in the 1960s, narratology has been an interdisci-
plinary project with many approaches to both narrative and
narrative theory [29]. Using the tenants of narratology, we
have developed a theoretical framework (Fig 1) for better un-
derstanding of the narrative of militancy in Swat. As shown,
the prevailing situation is supplemented by the ideological
base by narrative mentors. Then, common ground with the
target audience is exploited by propagating it through a suit-
able medium, which in its due course constructs a narrative.
The narrative then is personalized by its proponents and a
new social reality is constructed. Hermeneutics, which is
the subjective interpretation of narrative by the audiences
and the verisimilitude (believability) of the narrative instead
of its reality, play vital roles in the construction and suc-
cess of the narrative. Brockmeier and Meretoja claim that
hermeneutics plays a particularly vital role in narrative expla-
nations: “...we propose viewing narrative as a hermeneutic
practice in itself, a practice of meaning-making. This prac-
tice or perhaps better, this plethora of practices is of crucial
significance for complex processes of interpretation that
underlie, for instance, our ideas of self and identity” [30].
Figure 1. Narrative construction mechanism.
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3. Methodology
As this study focuses on the social construction of militants’
narratives, its overall approach lies within the realm of a
constructivist paradigm. Constructivism is traced back to
German scholars including Edmund Husserl (phenomenol-
ogy) and Wilhelm Dilthey (14). Constructivism implies that
realities are socially constructed. Thus, the fundamentals
of constructivism are to study mental interpretations, called
hermeneutics [31], which are central to this study. The
study combines this overall approach with a focus on dis-
course analysis. Developed in the 1970s, discourse analy-
sis assumes that there is much more being conveyed when
individuals communicate than simply giving information. It
goes beyond plain meanings and explores what individuals
or cultures “achieve through words” [32]. The reason for
employing these two approaches is to comprehend the con-
textual environment in Swat where militants formulated and
steered their narrative. This research is qualitative in order
to be able to interpret contextual elements and understand
a particular geographical setting [33].
The study area of this research work is Swat district.
Swat was chosen for this study based on the strategic
use of narratives by militants to gain control in the area
in the late 2000s, resulting in severe losses of life, prop-
erty and livelihood [34]. Swat is an administrative district
in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan near
its Afghanistan border. Until 1969, Swat was a princely
state of Indian sub-continent and was merged with Pakistan
after partition. Saidu Sharif is the capital of Swat and Min-
gora city is the main hub of business and social activities
in the valley. Towards the north of Swat valley is Chitral
and Gilgit–Baltistan, Dir and Mardan towards the west and
south, while River Indus towards its east. Administratively,
Swat is part of Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA)
of KP province. PATA is a hilly region with a total area of
5337 sq. km, and a population of 7.6 million [35].There
are seven tehsil (administrative units) in Swat district. Four
villages were selected in total from four of the tehsil of Swat,
based on the impacts of conflict on them. Tehsils included
Babuzai, Matta, Kabal, and Barikot.
Semi-structured interviews were our main tool of in-
vestigation. For this purpose, a carefully compiled set of
interview questions was developed to guide the interview
sessions. To be able to carry out discourse analysis, the
questions were open-ended, allowing the respondents to
share their perceptions regarding the situation and opening
up for debates on the issues brought to light. Thus, the
interview questions served as a guide for the exploration of
discourse rather than as a strict questionnaire that might
limit the responses to pre-determined topics. Audio-visual
aids were used during the interviews and the three authors
from the same ethnic background as the respondents tran-
scribed the interview recordings themselves.
A total of 73semi-structured interviews and one Focus
Group Discussion (FGD) were conducted. Due to special
security circumstances in Swat, snowball sampling tech-
nique was used to reach out to respondents. 40 interviews
were conducted in the selected four villages. Ten respon-
dents were selected from each selected village. The re-
spondents included: key persons (village elders), religious
figures, affected families, men and women who were in-
doctrinated by the speeches of militants on FM radio and
families which were against the militants during the con-
flict times. To make this study more representative and
cross sectional, 33 interviews were conducted out of the
study area in Swat district including intellectuals, politicians,
doctors, lawyers, teachers, journalists, landlords, civil and
armed forces members. The Army respondents included
both those currently serving and those who served during
the conflict. District administration respondents included:
Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, District Po-
lice Officer, and education officers (male and female). The
FGD was conducted in University of Swat, which included
both students and faculty members from Department of
Social and Gender Studies and Department of Cultural
Heritage, Tourism and Hospitality management. As for
secondary data, official publications, books, journals, peri-
odicals, newspapers and internet sources were consulted.
4. Discussion and Analysis
The narrative of militancy in Swat created conditions which
led to a devastating conflict in the area that affected the
whole region and resulted in a human security dilemma.
However, the primary sufferers were the dwellers of Swat
who faced the brunt of this militancy. This section presents
and discusses the data and findings of the study. It begins
with a description of the origins of the militants and then
discusses their narrative and strategy of steering this nar-
rative. The last part of this section discusses the political
agenda of the militants and their attitude towards women
during the conflict.
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Figure 2. Map of District Swat [36].
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4.1. Origin of the Militants in Swat
Data reveals that people in Swat have their doubts about
the origin of the militants. In the same interview, respon-
dents would narrate two different and conflicting stories,
one referring to how the militants gradually developed their
stature among the locals in Swat and the other a refusal to
believe that militants were locals from Swat. The majority
of the respondents were of the opinion that the militants
were outsiders and planted. There were, however, many
exceptions. A local scholar commented, “I am not agreeing
to the claim that militants were outsiders. Young local boys
from poor families were given guns and these deprived lot
started committing crimes against the locals. They robbed
nine banks on a single day.” The women respondents were
of the opinion that most of the militants were from the Swat
area but some of the militants were not Swati from their
appearance. Respondents from administration, both civil
and military, were sure about the identities of militants and
supported the idea that majority of the militants were from
local areas. Most of the respondents agreed that militants
coined their own myths, portraying themselves as saviors of
the locals. They agreed that those myths gained ground in
the general masses and helped the militants to attract more
audiences. Respondents from the villages accepted that
during that period, they used to believe that Maulvi Fazlullah
and his followers had supernatural powers, although the mili-
tants never claimed such power. “Once Maulana Sahab was
going on horseback and an army person tried to shoot him.
But whenever he would take aim, he would fail to see him
on horseback, rather he would see the Holy book riding the
horseback’, a local bus driver narrated this story, which he
heard about Fazlullah when he went to attend his address.
The first observation which struck the researchers dur-
ing the course of this study in Swat was the helpless looks
of the Swati respondents during the interviews, as they
expressed confusion and disbelief that Fazlullah could be
of the caliber to either deceive them or manage such a
sophisticated strategy single handedly. When the dust set-
tled in the post conflict Swat and common people clearly
visualized the militants’ planning during the conflict period,
the locals felt more and more confused, as it was widely
believed during the conflict times that the militants were
simple religious people who wanted an Islamic system in
Swat to deliver justice. After analyzing the collected data,
it can safely be said that most of the militants were from
three different streams. One stream came from the local
religious leaders, the other from deprived working class and
the third included militants from other parts of the country.
The leadership role was primarily in the hands of the reli-
gious leaders and the workforce, while the foot soldier role
was performed by the local youth. The strategic input was
mainly given by the militants coming from outside areas
including the tribal belt of Pakistan and perhaps connected
to Al-Qaeda. It seems likely that the actions of the militants
and their ruthlessness confused the locals about the mil-
itants’ identity more than their purpose of being in Swat.
Interestingly, people’s perception during the initial days of
the conflict was totally different.
In Swat, like other Pakhtun areas, religious figures are
considered innocent and anti-violence. For this reason, sig-
nificant donations were given to the militants in Swat from
the public during their initial phase. People also accept
that Fazlullah and most of his accomplices were locals, but
when they see the amount of suffering and brutalities, they
become confused. It is obvious that people of the area did
not consider the militants as having any political agenda, but
rather were considered to be a religiously-motivated simple
crowd that wanted an Islamic system. However, when the
political agenda of the militants unfolded as the establish-
ment of a state within a state, the locals were taken by sur-
prise and they refused to accept the militants as being local.
This was also the case where the economically-deprived
poor were recruited as ‘foot soldiers’. The ruthlessness
which the militants showed towards women and landlords
reveals the internal restlessness of the deprived class in
Swat, rather than any other phenomena. As EH Dance
(1960) mentioned regarding the post WWII scenario in Eu-
rope where the common rhetoric of people was “how could
we do it?”, the same process is prevailing in the post conflict
Swat, where people are not ready to take the blame of what
their support to militants did in Swat.
4.2. Militants’ Narrative
The messages of militants that formed their narrative played
a vital role in the militants’ success in Swat. Most of the
respondents, with the exception of lawyers and military
personnel, viewed the militants as icons of religiosity, and
people never considered them having any hidden agenda.
When asked about what the militants use to say in their
sermons, a teacher commented, “Everyone loves Islam and
peace here and it is also true that everyone is weary of the
current political and social situation in the country. What
would you do if someone says he is correcting everything
without any personal interest”? Another local from a villager
said, “They (militants) were very elaborative about the state
of affairs in the country. He was convincing in telling us
about the ideal lives of the Prophet (PBUH) and his Com-
panions that they want to implement here in Swat in the
name of Sharia”. An employee of a local NGO explained
along the same lines, “Poverty, injustice, social evils, bad
governance and then the dawn of a new era, what was
wrong in listening to it? We were hypnotized. He and his
followers were enchanting. What they were saying was
not un-Islamic. It was the portrayal of the society in the
context of present times along with a solution...” “His simple
message was that we are not following the path of Allah as
Americans are hindering our way. So America is the root
of all ills which the Muslims are facing, and to correct it we
must fight the Americans. Pakistan Army and government
are allies of the Americans that’s why they are also our
enemies”, said a political worker from one of the villages. A
shopkeeper, who was a regular listener to the militant ser-
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mons, commented “They were not asking anyone directly
to pick up arms against the government or evil but would
narrate stories of the just government of Hazrat Umar (sec-
ond caliph of Islam) and the story of Battle of Badr when
313 Muslims fought like lions against the infidels, the whole
world was conquered by Muslims through their swords. Me
and my family use to get so emotional that we would weep
when we listened to them”.
Most of the respondents agreed that it was the strength
of the narrators like Fazlullah, Shah Durran and Muslim
Khan, who applied and mixed the religious angles with the
cultural and social deprivations, that won the hearts and
minds of the people in Swat. “He (Fazlullah) use to ride a
black horse, carrying a sword and talking in the language of
the common Swati, as he himself was a common man and
knew what the common man understands. He had no issue
of making the people understand what he wanted them to
understand”, said a retired principal from Mingora city. Con-
fusion was created in the minds of Swati people, when the
initial attractive and enchanting narrative took the shape of a
violent ideology, where militants were acting as the decision
makers. Interestingly, the respondents themselves were
not clear about exactly went wrong. Most of the respon-
dents were trying to explain the militancy in Swat in terms
of a conspiracy theory, where the militants were playing in
the hands of someone else. None of the respondents was
ready to accept any guilt or share any responsibility for the
success of the militants. Data reveals that militants started
their narrative from simple religious sermons, where they
were calling people to the path of Allah to attain a better
life in this world and the hereafter. The militants attracted
the attention of the masses through their interaction, which
were purely religious. Respondents, especially the women,
were of the opinion that no one at that time doubted the pu-
rity of their narrative. All respondents equated the militants’
message more with the Waali era governance rather than
with Al-Qaeda’s narrative.
From the responses, we see that it is likely that early on
the Swati people misjudged the militants and their narrative.
When we study the speeches and the interaction of the mili-
tants, their utterances were purely Islamic, but their actions
were purely political in nature. People of Swat were ready to
accept their religious dogmas, but they could not reconcile
themselves with the militants’ political agenda that resulted
later in the public’s disfavor. Interestingly, the narrative was
delicately blended with political motives of TNSM in such
a way that people were directed towards the Waal e Swat
era, even without naming him. This is in line with Quiggin,
(2009) (11) who explained that militants always identify and
stress traditional politics around issues such as injustice,
poverty, access to resources, exploitation and corruption
to attract the public’s attention. At the same time, the trick
which narrativity plays i.e. “hermeneutics” of the people
played a role in the success of militants’ narrative. While Fa-
zlullah was aggressive and focused in his communications
(unlike Sufi Muhammad),the Swati people did not interpret
from his narrative exactly what he was saying, rather they
interpreted what they(people) imagined. Within no time, the
militants’ narrative moved beyond mere religious teachings
and entered into political domain, yet people failed to visual-
ize its repercussions. The militants’ narrative in Swat mixed
their religious identity with their political agenda in such a
manner that locals were accepting all their gestures with
religious justification even if they were purely political.
From the very beginning, militants were objecting to the
judicial system and the governance issues in Swat, which
meant militants wanted a new political system to be gov-
erned by them. The judicial system of Waal e Swat is still
remembered by Swati people, and the idea of a just ruler
is identified and interpreted in Swat as the rule of Waali
e Swat generally. Due to this memory, they can be easily
beguiled by anyone alluding to a system of politics that
might seem to be similar (when it was in fact not). Thus,
as the social justice of Waal e Swat was remembered, a
notion that the Waali state was an Islamic state was easily
developed. That is probably the reason that locals in Swat
did not hesitate to easily accept the militant narrative with
its political facet. Militants knew, however, that internal and
external forces would certainly comprehend their hidden
agenda. That was the reason that, through their narrative,
militants declared the state of Pakistan as an American
stooge and a hurdle in the implementation of their brand of
Islamic Sharia.
In summary, it is clear that the religious and political narrative
which militants floated in Swat was so powerful and well-
disguised that the local could not judge it, and, in between
the confusion and atrocities, people found themselves prey to
this narrative. Militants were successful in constructing a new
reality for Swati people. The political goal of militants seemed
to secure an independent area which had its connectivity with
Afghanistan and could provide a safe haven to all the militants
from other parts of the country. While the locals were given
an impression that militants wanted to bring back the golden
era of Waali e Swat, without formally stating it. How TTS
leader and their commanders (who were local laymen and at
best had some religious education) got training and acumen
for designing this plan, or “Their Narrative”, is still debatable.
Such high-level strategic planning from them was unexpected,
ultimately confusing locals who blame foreign hands for the
militancy in Swat. Resultantly, even after so much bloodshed,
locals are more vocal about the conspiracy theories, rather
than accepting the atrocities committed by local militants.
4.3. Militants’ Strategy of Steering their Narrative
Data reveals that militants in Swat propagated their narrative
in stages. In first stage they were only attracting the peo-
ple to listen to the Word of Allah. Later, they started a kind
of religious Q & A session with locals who would ask them
question or present their problems and request replies in light
of Islamic teachings. The third stage of militants’ narrative
started when they asked for donations to construct an Islamic
center at Imam Dheri. Respondents agreed that donations
given by the people were enormous, which showed the pop-
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ularity of the militants, who were certainly encouraged. The
last stage of the militant narrative came when they used force
to stop people from what they declared to be ‘evil deeds’. The
militants began adding things to their narration and, suddenly,
the simple narrators became militant. “Islam came to nullify
the falsehood, the sword was used against the infidels by
Muslims, we are facing evil in the shape of present rulers and
we can’t get justice without fighting for it. If we supported
them (militants), an ideal life was waiting for us”, said a lawyer
from Mingora city. Replying to the question of why people
would listen to the FM radio in this modern age, most of the
people were of the opinion that it was at first their choice
but later it was forced on them for two reasons: Firstly, that
all other means of information were mostly destroyed, and
secondly, people used to listen to it as the militants use to
threaten people and warn them on the FM radio channel. “I
used to listen to it every day because I was scared that may
be my name would be taken and then it would be my turn
to die”, said a private medical practitioner in Mingora city. “It
was a very well-planned activity. Militants first persuaded
people to do away with all the modern information tools like
TV etc. Then they blasted the electrical power stations and
used force to stop people watching TV. People were com-
pelled to have only one means of information and that was
their FM radio” said a composed young man and government
employee from one of the villages. Similarly, police stations
were destroyed and their records were burnt so that people
easily go to the militants instead of police for help. This also
helped the militants to easily sell their narrative.
In Malakand Division, Sufi Muhammad started his nar-
rative in Swat district for social justice and Islamic Sharia
in early 1990s. Although local people supported him and
he was successful in rallying people around him, his failure
in his Afghan mission, where he took many volunteers to
fight alongside Taliban regime in Afghanistan, made him
less attractive to people. At the same time, Sufi Muham-
mad started his movement from another level of social and
cultural understanding in Swat, rather than methodically
from the grassroots. Thus, while his demands were popular,
his groundwork was not very convincing. When Fazlullah
and his followers came to the forefront in Swat, they did
not demand anything from anyone, but rather started using
the loudspeakers and later the FM radio to simply narrate
the Islamic injunctions related to a pious life. According to
Austin, words do not only have a contextual meaning or
say something specific, but they are actions, provided that
they fulfill certain conventions [37]. Fazlullah and his follow-
ers were saying things with religious meanings; however,
their cultural and situation connections urged the locals
in a new direction. As Harding [38] says, a narrator may
go beyond the conventional scripts, leading people to see
human happenings in a fresh way, indeed, in a way they
had never before “noticed” or even dreamed of. This is
exactly what militants did. The suffering and political prob-
lems of the people were equated with their non-religious
attitudes and a fresh window of faith and good life was
shown to them. Reality was reconstructed for the locals in
accordance with the wishes of the militants. It is important
to note that the actions of militants regarding the demol-
ishing of police stations, grid stations and TV and other
media sources were very meticulous and timely. Militants
were following a strategically thought-out procedure, while
locals were considering them as simple Mullah (religious
men) who wanted people to come back to religious ways.
This mistake of misunderstanding the militants’ real motives
helped the militants to freely propagate their narrative while
maintaining innocence. Similarly, peoples’ confusion over
how simple men from Maddrassa (religious schools) could
do this kind of planning remained permanently engraved in
the minds of Swati people, who even now are not ready to
believe that they were deceived by the militants. However, it
was the novel method of communication, strategic thinking
of destroying the other means of information and making
people dependent on them for justice, that brought success
to the narrative of militancy in Swat.
Although it is clear from the data that the narrative of the
militants was well-planned, it was not itself developed by
the militants in Swat. Well before the militants’ success in
Swat, militants had sanctuaries in different parts of Pakistan
and Afghanistan, which provided the Swati militant with an
already well-prepared plan of action. The only obvious
difference, which could be seen in the case of Swat, was
the willingness of the people, which was even beyond the
imaginations of Fazlullah himself. The memories of Waali
e Swat ’s government makes the Swat case unique, where
militants were saying one thing, people were listening to it
in another mindset and were interpreting it in terms of the
lost state of Waali, which made the task of militants easier.
4.4. Political Agenda of Militants
Data reveals that militants in Swat kept their political agenda
hidden from the locals. The narrative of the militants was
coined in such a way that people could hardly understand
their hidden motives.
“All they were fighting for was the cause of Allah against
the infidels. We never thought along the lines that militants
are using us for their own agenda. Maulvi Fazlullah was
talking about Islam and the path of Allah and we were con-
sidering ourselves as soldiers of Allah” said a former accom-
plice of the militants, who was now jobless and scared, as
everyone was looking towards him with suspicion. “Looking
at these phenomena from any angle, the militants were try-
ing to get political leverage. The whole thing was wrapped
in the garb of Islam. Although, they were pointing towards
the political issues of bad governance, and people were tak-
ing it as the will of Allah to follow them and get an ideal life”,
opined a university professor from Khwazakhela. “Fazlullah
had the leverage of being a common man and part of the
same society where he was now enjoying a power status.
This gave him the upper hand because he was talking the
same thing which he knew the society understands and
wants. Memory of the good governance of Waali e Swat
is commonly interpreted as Sharia in Swat, which was ex-
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ploited by him”, said a retired senior Army officer from Min-
gora. All the respondents were of the opinion that the way
in which militants constructed their narrative was accept-
able to the masses, and, as a result, they were off-guard
in front of the militants. Most of the respondents explained
that, below the surface, everything that the militants were
preaching was part of their political agenda, rather than any
religious service. Respondents were unanimous about the
fact that militants turned the minds of masses to the political
ends while justifying their atrocities in the name of religion.
This political agenda of militants only became obvious in its
later stages, when they demanded the implementation of
Sharia in Malakand Division, which was even accepted by
the federal government. Respondents were of the opinion
that by playing on the card of good governance, Fazlullah
wanted to place himself as Waali of Swat under the garb
of religiosity. Most respondents agreed that when the gen-
eral masses realized the real agenda of the militants, they
turned against them, but by then the brutality and power of
the militants was beyond the limits of common people.
Militants never expressed their intentions for political
power. They proceeded very methodically and attracted
the attention of locals through their FM radio. The militants
started preaching the values of Islam and then they started
pointing towards the social ills, which are always present in
every society. However, the militants equated it with the non-
religiosity of the people and started giving their own solution
in the name of religion. It was likely at this point that militants
started unfolding their political agenda, without even men-
tioning it. Locals did not notice any shift from mere religious
activity to political sphere and continued with their support of
the militants. In summary, militants prepared ground for their
narrative by making people to listen to what they wanted to
say. Then, they made the people aware of the prevailing bad
situation by explaining it in the context of religion. Next, they
incorporated the social issues in religious sermons. People
accepted the militants’ narrative and once that was done,
the political decision-making of the area logically fell in the
hands of militants. However, it is now clear that the militants
were political from the very outset, and the locals who could
not understand their motives could only be called naı̈ve. The
argument is that there was no question of Islamic govern-
ment or implementation or even explanation of Islamic rules
or text. From Sufi Muhammad to Fazlullah, it was always
political and only religious to the extent that could make their
claim valid or acceptable in Swat. Interestingly, in societies
like Pakistan, governance issues are always present, and
people are always open to those who promise to resolve
them. Being an independent state, Swat under Waali e Swat
enjoyed a period of good governance. The idealized era of
the Waali and the historic realities in Swat shows that peo-
ple there act cumulatively for social change when they are
suffocated politically, economically or socially. Again, people
in Swat have always welcomed a religious figure to lead
them politically in times of crisis. Similar historic leverages
cannot be found in any other area of Pakistan, which makes
Swat naturally a fertile ground for militants and their agenda.
This mindset was well known to militants being locals from
Swat and they manipulated it tactfully. With support of the
local population, militants wanted to dominate the political
scene in Swat and become forerunners of similar uprisings
throughout the country. The militants’ sole concentration on
the drawbacks in judicial system in Swat was aimed at play-
ing on the memories of the effective judicial system of Waali
times, which is still fresh in the minds of locals. Thus, with-
out even referring to the Waali, militants cashed upon the
local people’s hermeneutics. This propagation and actions
of providing speedy justice alone can explain the political
agenda that was a Waali kind of government in a Waali kind
of “State of Swat”.
4.5. Women and Militants’ Narrative in Swat
The majority of the respondents confirmed that militants tried
their best to influence the female population through their
speeches and were highly successful at it. The militants’
narrative accorded a new role to women in Swat and urged
them to instigate their husbands and sons to support the mili-
tants. Respondents told that the new role and new window
of importance that was given to the women in Swat by the
militants created conducive environments for the militants’
narrative in Swat. Female respondents were of the opinion
that militants tricked them and played with their religious emo-
tions by exploiting their soft nature. The female education
officer along with female teachers and female students during
a group discussion revealed that the basic reason of militants’
popularity amongst the women in Swat was their sudden
exposure to the militants’ narrative through FM radio, without
a proper counter narrative or background knowledge.
“I used to wait for Falullah’s sermon on radio. I used
to think that we have spoiled our lives as he used to tell
stories of the sacrifices made by great female Companions
during times of the holy Prophet (PBUH). Yes, I instigated
my husband to go and contribute in the way of Allah with
them “were the comments of a female schoolteacher, when
asked about teachings of the militants. “I used to hear their
FM radio when my kids would go to school in the initial
days. Women would ask questions about daily life and they
would answer in a very convincing manner. But later the FM
radio became a means of listening to names of those who
were persecuted or to be persecuted by the militants” said
a female employee of a local NGO. “First when I started
listening to their speeches through loudspeakers and then
through FM, it was good. They used to tell the women
especially about their rights in Islam. They used to say that
women can spend money of their husbands without their
permission in the way of Allah. I gave money to them as I
was moved by their speeches”, said a female respondent.
Another woman disclosed with regrets that she con-
tributed all of her jewelry as a donation for the cause of
Islam. “I not only urged my husband to visit Imam Dheri
to listen to the sermons of Maulana Sahib, but also forced
my son to work as a laborer in the construction work at
Imam Dheri Madrassah”, commented an elderly lady. Data
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reveals that militants popularized their narrative by incor-
porating women but then punished and threatened women
the most when they gained power.” I ran away along with
my four daughters to Mardan, Allah saved us, but I can-
not tell you the way we reached Mardan. Someone told
me that they have mentioned our names on the radio that
we were involved in Un-Islamic practices”, said a scared
and reluctant lady singer. Data also revealed that besides
public punishments for women, forced marriages were con-
tracted at many places, even with underage girls, which
is not openly expressed by the families even now due to
cultural barriers in Swat. The scholars and administration
segment of respondents were unanimous in their account
that militants tried using the old tribal mentality to alienate
females, starting from the local artists and extending to
the girls’ educational institutions at later stage. Lawyers in
the area confirmed that militants were justifying their acts
against females by narrating religious and traditional norms
of chastity and modesty.
It is important to note that in rural Swat, most women do
not work outside their houses and normally they get their free
time when the men go to work after breakfast in the morn-
ing. That time was then utilized by militants to gain access
to women through their FM radio, using indoctrination tac-
tics through their narrative. The female population was thus
the first target that was exposed to the militants’ narrative.
Militants indoctrinated women through their fiery speeches
and Islamic injunctions with promises for rewards in hereafter
and thus they got access to the family lives of Swati people.
Militants used women not only to influence their male rela-
tives, but also to get large amounts of money in the shape
of donations for the Islamic cause. The cause of such blind
trust was the motivational speeches of the militants specif-
ically targeting women, which were mostly religious, mixed
with some historic cultural events where women contributed
in the interest of religion and society. The militants even
declared that a wife can donate money without the permis-
sion of the husband and this act shall be rewarded by Allah
in the hereafter. But when the militants got hold of Swat,
it was the female population who suffered the most at the
militants’ hands. The reasons behind the atrocities against
women in Swat were many. Firstly, militants wanted to give a
tough message to opponents that their women are vulnerable,
which becomes a great source of worry in Patkhtun society.
Secondly, the tribal-minded traditionalists started supporting
militants’ acts against women, which looked more Islamic
to them. Thirdly, to avoid pubic punishment, people started
giving their female relatives in marriage contracts to militant
commanders. Fourthly, this militant policy gave uniqueness
and more power to militants and their narrative as people
started believing that militants can do everything, and that
going against them led to public humiliations.
5. Conclusion
Fazlullah exploited the situation in Swat by providing an
ideological base for his presence. Instead of following the
rhetoric of Sufi Muhammad, he borrowed his ideology from
Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban, blended it with local culture
and developed a well thought-out localized narrative. He
did not force his idea of jehad (Islamic concept of holy war)
immediately, instead followed a stepwise approach. He
established a mobile FM radio station and gave sermons
on Islamic teachings, addressing women specifically. This
increased the intensity of religious feelings in the whole lo-
cality, as women started urging their male relatives towards
the militants’ narrative. With a ban on watching TV, the
number of Fazlullah’s listeners increased manifold.
People were compelled to be exposed to militants’ narra-
tive as FM remained the only source of information, when the
electric power stations were bombed and announcements
of Islamic punishments to the “evil doers” started on the ra-
dio. The next stage began when Fazlullah objected to the
governance issues in the area. Fazlullah thus localized his
narrative by making it a Swati model of jehad. This step led
him to reconstruct the social reality in Swat by making his own
rules to punish the evil. The political motives of Fazlullah were
never questioned by locals as they were thinking in terms of
the return of Waali e Swat days. It can safely be said then
that militants in Swat were indirectly supported by locals, mes-
merized by their narrative to establish a separate state on the
model of Waali e Swat. Fazllullah’s personal whims started
seeping into the social fabric of Swat. Hermeneutics played a
dual role in Swat conflict for the local people. The narrative of
Fazlullah convinced people in a way that they interpreted his
message as true and relevant, while on other hand people
interpreted the state’s narrative negatively. This whole phe-
nomenon was never questioned by Fazlullah’s followers as
narrativity says; verisimilitude was in action rather than the
objective thinking in society. Thus, Fazlullah followed all the
essential parts of a successful narrative, including relationality,
causal employment, selective appropriation and temporality.
The mastery of Fazlullah in constructing and selling his narra-
tive, gathered masses around him in Swat and he remained
preponderant for quite sometime in the whole area.
Keeping in view the latent potential of militant narrative con-
struction mechanisms and the vulnerability of the general
masses in Pakistan specifically and the world in general where
religious sentiments run high, this process cannot be discarded
as one-time phenomenon. The use of soft power resources,
construction of narratives and efforts to popularize them to gain
massive public support can be used again by others subse-
quently to mobilize and initiate social change according to their
whims. Serious policy options must be formulated based on
further research findings to address the strategic mechanisms
of militancy, rather than leaving it to chance.
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